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Abstract 
We examine the relationship between firm performance and corporate governance in 
microfinance institutions (MFI) using a self-constructed global dataset on MFIs collected from 
third-party rating agencies. Using random effects panel data estimations, we study the effects of 
board and CEO characteristics, firm ownership type, customer-firm relationship, and 
competition and regulation on an MFI’s financial performance and outreach to poor clients. We 
find that financial performance improves with local rather than international directors, an 
internal board auditor, and a female CEO. The number of credit clients increase with 
CEO/chairman duality. Outreach is lower in the case of lending to individuals than in the case 
of group lending. We find no difference between non-profit organisations and shareholder firms 
in financial performance and outreach, and we find that bank regulation has no effect. The 
results underline the need for an industry specific approach to MFI governance. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of governance mechanisms on microfinance 
institutions’ (MFIs) dual missions of financial sustainability and providing banking services to 
micro-enterprises and low-income families. We identify three dimensions to this problem: a 
vertical dimension between owners and management, a horizontal dimension between the MFI 
and its customers, and an external governance dimension. Recommendations for better 
governance are made primarily for the first and third dimensions. For example, Rock et al. 
(1998), Otero and Chu (2002), and Helms (2006) suggest importing best practices in 
governance from developed countries, such as board independence and shareholder ownership. 
Van Greuning et al. (1999) and Hardy et al. (2003) argue for better MFI regulation. 
However, problems of credit risk assessment and repayment
1
 make governance of firm-
customer interactions potentially more important in banking than in other industries (Adams 
and Mehran, 2003b). This is the focus in the present study. For example, if an MFI has a high 
percentage of female loan clients, should it adjust its governance accordingly? Group lending is 
seen as a method to ensure repayment (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). Is an 
MFI’s financial performance enhanced when the MFI supplies its customers primarily with 
group loans? 
                                                          
1
 Two factors make an MFI’s loan portfolio different from that of a bank. First, it is generally 
semi- or uncollateralised. Second, repayment time is generally short. Thus, an MFI faces the 
risk of steep deterioration of its portfolio in a matter of only a few weeks. 
 3 
We use recently released data from third-party rating agencies, yielding a unique dataset of 278 
MFIs from 60 countries between 1998 and 2007. Thus, we respond to Morduch (1999) and 
Hartarska’s (2005) requests for the use of better data in the analysis of microfinance questions. 
Microfinance is high on the public agenda after the UN Year of Microcredit in 2005 and the 
awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Mohammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank in 2006. 
Nevertheless, microfinance still reaches only a fraction of the world’s poor (Robinson, 2001; 
Christen et al., 2004). Helms (2006) and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (C-GAP 
2004, 2006) consider the lack of strong MFIs to be a major constraint on the further 
development of the microfinance industry, and CSFI (2008) identifies governance as a major 
obstacle to MFI growth.  
Few studies have been published on corporate governance in MFIs. Hartarska (2005) 
investigates the relationship between governance mechanisms and financial and outreach 
performance, using three surveys of rated and unrated Eastern European MFIs between 1998 
and 2002. Governance mechanisms include board characteristics, CEO compensation, and 
ownership type.
2
 Hartarska (2005) includes several institutional and firm control variables and 
finds that a more independent board gives a better return on assets (ROA). However, a board 
with employee directors results in lower financial performance and outreach. The difference in 
financial performance and outreach between various ownership types is negligible.  
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 Ownership type refers to the various legal incorporations found in MFIs, ranging from 
shareholder-owned firms to cooperatives. 
 4 
Cull et al. (2007) also investigate MFI financial performance and outreach by focusing on 
lending methodology.
3
 They use data from 124 MFIs around the world and find that financial 
performance improves, up to a point, with individual loans, and that MFIs concentrate more on 
individual loans. Governance variables, such as board characteristics or ownership type, are not 
considered. 
Our study is therefore justified by the neglect of the MFI-customer dimension, the limited 
number of academic studies available, our large and comprehensive global dataset, and the fact 
that some governance mechanisms, like competition and internal board auditor, remain 
unexplored in the literature.  
Our findings indicate that most corporate governance mechanisms have little impact on MFIs’ 
financial and outreach performance. However, results show that financial performance 
improves when the board is informed by an internal auditor and has local directors, and when 
the CEO is a woman. For outreach, measured by the number of credit customers and average 
loan amount, CEO/chairman duality increases the number of credit clients. Outreach is reduced 
with individual lending. Generally, there is no difference between non-profit organisations and 
shareholder firms in either financial performance or outreach. Similarly, bank regulation also 
does not seem to have an impact on financial and outreach performance. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses. Section 3 presents an 
overview of the data sources and estimation method, and descriptive evidence is reported in 
Section 4. Section 5 presents econometric evidence. Section 6 concludes and proposes a new 
research agenda. 
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 Lending methodology refers to the way loans are given. The categories used are individual 
loans, group loans, and village banks, which are larger groups of approximately 20 members. 
 5 
2. Governance and performance in MFIs 
Governance is about achieving corporate goals. The first goal of MFIs is to reach more clients 
in the poorer strata of the population, and the second goal is financial sustainability. We analyse 
the relationship between governance mechanisms and both outreach and financial performance. 
Financial performance is assessed in terms of overall profitability, through such measures as 
return on assets (ROA
4
), operational self-sufficiency (OSS
5
), revenues (portfolio yield), and 
operational costs (Christen, 2000). Using these measures enables us to pinpoint more clearly 
under what conditions a particular governance mechanism is effective. The outreach measures 
are the MFI’s average outstanding loan and the number of credit clients served (Schreiner, 
2002). Table 1 summarises the dependent variables. 
Table 1 
The table confirms the high (nominal) portfolio yield usually experienced in MFIs. Thus, an 
average of nearly 40% is not surprising in these markets. All returns in the regression analysis 
are adjusted for inflation. Thus, we use real rates for ROA [(ROA – inflation) / (1 + inflation)] 
and portfolio yield. The average loan reflects the “micro” in microfinance. The lowest loan 
amount is US $2.22, the average loan amount is US $788, and the median is US $441. The 
maximum amount of approximately US $25,000 is an extreme case, which is twice the amount 
of the next largest loan. We filter out the extreme cases above US $10,000 and adjust the 
remaining loans to purchasing power parity GDP (World Economic Outlook, IMF).  
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 Debt/equity levels differ considerably between MFIs. Hence, ROA is more appropriate than 
ROE (return on equity) when measuring financial results across different institutions. ROA is 
calculated based on operational profits before donations and taxes. 
5
 OSS is a widely used proxy for institutional sustainability. Table 1 gives its definition.  
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Incentive problems in a bank have at least two dimensions: one between the owner(s) and 
management (including the board), and the other between the MFI and its customers (Macey 
and O’Hara, 2003). Overviews by Becht et al. (2003) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) show 
that governance in the owner-board dimension is important in general, while Rock et al. (1998), 
Otero and Chu (2002), and Helms (2006) underline its importance specifically in microfinance. 
In the MFI-customer dimension, an MFI is subject to problems of credit risk assessment and 
repayment because credit clients typically have little or no collateral (Armendariz de Aghion 
and Morduch, 2005). Microfinance initiatives find new ways to deal with these problems 
through group lending, character lending, and the gradual building of a credit history. In group 
lending, using either solidarity groups or village banks, the MFI delegates much of the 
screening and monitoring efforts to the group. In contrast, the customers’ relationship with the 
MFI is more direct in individual lending. Furthermore, the special nature of banks as providers 
of a financial infrastructure often requires public regulation of the bank-customer relationship. 
Studying the governance of MFIs therefore requires three considerations: the relationship 
between the owner(s) and the board, the relationship between the MFI and its customers, and 
the external conditions of competition and regulation. 
Table 2 summarises the independent variables, their definitions, and the hypotheses relating to 
financial performance and outreach. 
Table 2  
The remainder of this section discusses the three dimensions of governance. First, the owner-
board dimension concerns board composition and ownership type. Board composition variables 
are CEO/chairman duality, international directors, internal auditor, and board size. Ownership 
type is a dummy variable for a shareholder-owned MFI. 
 7 
CEO/chairman duality may be a sign of CEO entrenchment (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991, 
1998), in which the CEO can pursue policies that yield private benefits. The Cadbury 
Committee (1992) advises against this duplication in roles. However, duality may enhance 
decision-making effectiveness. This ambiguity may explain why Brickley et al. (1997) do not 
find that firms with a CEO-chairman separation outperform those with CEO/chairman duality. 
Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) find that firm performance improves with the presence of 
international directors. 
Steinwand (2000) recommends an internal auditor in the MFI who reports directly to the board. 
Ideally, the internal auditor provides the board with independent, objective assessments on the 
MFI operations. This should improve financial and social performance.  
A larger board may induce members to free-ride in their monitoring responsibility, allowing the 
CEO greater independence. Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) report that larger 
boards are associated with lower firm performance, measured as Tobin’s Q or ROA. Bennedsen 
et al. (2008) confirm the negative relationship in small family firms. Hartarska (2005) confirms 
the result in ROA regressions for MFIs. Adams and Mehran (2003a) present contrary evidence 
from banking firms in the USA, and de Andres and Eleuterio Vallelado (2008) agree based on 
Spanish data. Many MFIs are non-profit organisations (NPOs). Handy (1995) proposes that 
board members in NPOs offer their reputation as collateral and Speckbacher (2008) argues that 
NPOs need larger boards because they lack owners with monetary incentives to monitor their 
investments. Similar to Hartarska’s findings (2005), we expect a larger board to reduce firm 
performance.  
Legal incorporation or ownership type may play a role in MFI performance. Similar to regular 
banking (Rasmussen, 1988; Hansmann, 1996), ownership of MFIs differs significantly (Labie, 
2001; Mersland, forthcoming). NPOs are often considered to be weaker structures because they 
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lack owners with a financial stake in operations (Jansson and Westley, 2004), which leads to 
lower financial performance than that of shareholder firms (SHFs). Accordingly, Ledgerwood 
and White (2006) and Fernando (2004) argue for the transformation of NPOs into SHFs. 
However, NPOs are believed to be more effective at reaching poor customers. These findings 
imply that SHFs should show better financial performance but reach fewer poor clients than 
NPOs. However, Mersland and Strøm (2008) find that SHFs and NPOs perform equally well. 
The incentive problems between owners and managers may be more pronounced in NPOs, but 
NPOs have the compensatory benefit of reducing adverse selection of customers and avoiding 
moral hazard (Hansmann, 1996; Desrochers and Fischer, 2002; Mersland, forthcoming) 
because they are better able to tap into local information networks. Evidence in Caprio and 
Vittas (1997) and Cull et al. (2006) confirms this. Many SHFs are not run according to the 
shareholder value model, since they may be committed to reaching the poor (Reille and Forster, 
2008). If this were true, we would expect to confirm the findings of Valnek (1998), Crespi et al. 
(2004), and Mersland and Strøm (2008) that NPOs perform as well as SHFs.  
Allen and Gale (2000) caution about the effectiveness of monitoring; they note that the board’s 
monitoring is often ineffective due to the firm’s financing out of retained earnings. Owners may 
find it advantageous to yield control to the CEO. They show that this is more relevant when the 
business uncertainty is greater and the divergence is smaller between the interests of the CEO 
and of the owners. This may be relevant for the microfinance field because the information 
asymmetry between the board and the CEO is likely to be large, and because the owners, board, 
and managers may share the same goals. Many MFIs are monitored by an agent and not a 
principal, since they are funded by back-donors or taxpayers. Furthermore, many MFIs often 
struggle with identifying board members who have an appropriate background and who are 
willing and able to dedicate the necessary time to monitor management effectively (Labie, 
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2001). Thus, we expect governance in the owner-board dimension to be less important than in 
the MFI-customer dimension. 
This encourages an emphasis on the CEO in the MFI-customer dimension. One of the 
innovations in microfinance has been the targeting of female customers (Armendariz de Aghion 
and Morduch, 2005). Female customers constitute approximately 73% of our data. We presume 
that a female CEO is better at obtaining information from predominantly female customers than 
is a male CEO, and we expect that this improved knowledge influences the MFI’s operational 
costs and overall profitability and outreach.   
The loan methodology, group or individual lending, is another aspect of the MFI-customer 
dimension. Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) point out that group lending may 
increase the repayment rate because it leads to positive assortative matching. In other words, the 
best credit risk groups naturally come together as a result of local knowledge of trustworthiness. 
When this is the case, we should expect group lenders to show better firm performance. 
However, Cull et al. (2007) find that individual lenders enjoy the highest financial returns, 
whereas group lenders show greater outreach to poorer customers. We expect these empirical 
findings to hold in the present study.  
Stakeholders on the board arguably influence the governance of an MFI. Hartarska (2005) finds 
that employee directors are negatively related to financial performance and outreach. In our 
data, stakeholder representation is surprisingly low, ranging from 2% for debt-holder 
representation to 11% for customers. Employee directors are found in 7% of MFIs, and donor 
directors in 9%. We also find that no stakeholder group improves firm performance or outreach 
(unpublished data). 
External governance mechanisms, such as product market competition and regulation, may be 
relevant for microfinance. In general, the more intense the competition, the less owners need 
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internal governance mechanisms (Hart, 1983; Schmidt, 1997). However, Nickell (1996) argues 
that because increased competition may reduce costs, the negative effect of lower product 
prices may be outweighed. Therefore, the effect on performance is uncertain. Petersen and 
Rajan (1995) argue that the bank earns rent on survivors in long-term relationships. When 
relationships are undermined by competition, banks terminate lending to risky and costly 
customers. This can reduce outreach, and Berger and Udell (1998) confirm this for smaller 
firms, and McIntosh and Wydick (2005) do likewise for MFIs. However, Vesala (2007) 
introduces switching costs and predicts a V-shaped rather than a monotonous relationship 
between relational banking and competition. From Spanish bank data Delgado and Saurina 
(2007) report that relational banking is more common in mutual banks than in private. 
Many MFIs are not regulated. Van Greuning et al. (1999) recommend a step-wise regulatory 
approach that reflects the heterogeneity of MFIs and their operating conditions. A regulated 
MFI is more likely to earn customers’ trust, which should lead to improved financial 
performance. On the other hand, regulation is associated with costs like security requirements, 
investments in information technology, and the stifling of MFI innovations. Thus, such costs 
may outweigh the benefits (Hardy et al., 2003). When regulated, the MFIs gain access to low-
cost depositor funding. Hence, the effect on financial performance is uncertain, as is the effect 
on outreach. Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) confirm that regulation has no direct effect on 
social and financial performance of MFIs, but may indirectly affect outreach if regulated MFIs 
are allowed the mobilisation of savings. 
These considerations indicate the importance of taking into account firm-specific control 
variables. Therefore, in the present study, we include the following: weights of urban and rural 
lending, MFI experience, portfolio risk, and firm size. The 2004 Human Development Index 
(Human Development Report, 2006) is used to control for country-specific effects.  
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3. Data issues and methodology 
The dataset contains information from risk assessment reports from five microlender rating 
agencies, MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet Rating, Crisil, and M-Cril, and their reports can be 
found at www.ratingfund.org. All five are approved as official rating agencies by the 
Ratingfund of the C-GAP. Their rating methodology reveals no major difference in MFI 
assessment relevant to variables used in this study.  
The rating agency obtains, at most, four years of financial data, along with data on the MFI’s 
characteristics, such as board size and composition, at each rating. The reports in the database 
cover 278 MFIs from 60 countries
6
 gathered from 2000 to 2007, with the vast majority from the 
last four years. When necessary, all entries in the dataset have been annualised and dollarised 
using official exchange rates. 
The use of rating data may introduce sample selection bias. Few larger regulated microfinance 
banks are included in the dataset, since they have funders who demand traditional credit ratings 
offered by agencies such as Standard & Poor’s. Moreover, neither the virtually endless number 
of small savings and credit cooperatives nor development programs offering microcredit solely 
as a social service are included. The 278 MFIs in the dataset represent commercial and 
professionally oriented institutions that have decided to be rated to improve access to funding, 
benchmark themselves against others, and increase transparency (see www.ratingfund.org). We 
consider our data, which were collected by third parties, to be more reliable than self-reported 
data sources like Mixmarket (www.mixmarket.org) or questionnaires. Compared to the MFIs 
included in Mixmarket Annual MFI Benchmarks (2006), the MFIs in our sample are younger (7 
vs. 9 median years), smaller (median total assets $2.9 million vs. $6.2 million), have fewer 
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 The country list is available from the authors upon request. 
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credit clients (4,900 vs. 10,000), and have smaller loan portfolios ($2.1 million vs. $4.4 
million), yet the median average loan is approximately the same ($433 for our dataset vs. $456 
for the Mixmarket data). Comparing averages between the two is not meaningful, since the 
Mixmarket data contain more of the very large MFIs. Overall, our data seem sufficiently 
representative. Specifically, we avoid a large firm bias. 
The panel data are structured such that annual observations of the financial variables are 
available for up to four consecutive years; however, because the governance variables are often 
reported only once, they must be assumed to be constant over the whole period. For example, 
board variables are constant. We estimate coefficients using the random effects method 
(Greene, 2003) from the model: 
itiitit )u(Xy 

                (1) 
Here,   is the mean of unobserved heterogeneity, iu  is heterogeneity specific to firm i , it  is 
the remaining firm-year heterogeneity, ity  is the dependent variable, and 

itX  is the vector of 
explanatory variables and the vector of coefficients, respectively. This formulation implies that 
the constant term in the regression must be interpreted as the average firm-year heterogeneity. 
The random effects method transforms the original data. For example, using ity , the dependent 
variable for the i
th
 case in year t, the transformed rity  is: 
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              (2) 
Here, ly  is the individual firm average and   is the standard deviation of the residual it , 
which is assumed to be constant. u  is the standard deviation of firm heterogeneity, and it is 
also assumed to be constant. T is the number of years of data, which, in this case, equals four. 
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We calculate these standard deviations by first running a generalised least squares (GLS) 
regression assuming a random effects structure, carry out the transformations above, and then 
run a three-stage least squares procedure (3SLS; Greene, 2003) on the transformed data. The 
full procedure produces roughly the same coefficients as the original GLS regression, but the 
standard errors are smaller. Since the posited relationships, if they exist, are linear, the 3SLS is 
a valid method. One advantage of the 3SLS is that this method does not require assumptions of 
distributional form. 
4. Descriptive evidence 
Table 3 shows the main values of the explanatory variables. 
Table 3 
The table shows that the number of observations of most independent variables is much smaller 
than for the dependent variables in table 1 because the former often represent fixed firm 
characteristics.  
The mean of many of the variables can be interpreted as the percentage of firms in the category. 
Thus, 28.9% are shareholder-owned firms.
7
 Based on international comparison, the average 
board size of 7.33 directors is low. In addition, CEO/chairman duality is low. Half of MFIs in 
our sample have an internal auditor reporting to the board, which is also low given the 
importance given to this measurement in microfinance policy.  
23.5% of CEOs are women. This is a very high percentage, which may reflect the high 
percentage of female customers (73%). More than half of the MFIs emphasise individual loans. 
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 58.1% of the sample consists of non-profit, non-governmental MFIs, and the remainder is 
cooperatives, state banks, and “other” institutions.  
 14 
This is a surprising finding because group lending is considered to be one of the hallmarks of 
microfinance. 
Banking authorities regulate 34.9% of MFI firms. Our seven-point competition measure shows 
that the firm’s average subjective experience of competition is high. The measure is based on 
on-site evaluations by raters, which we transform into a common 1-7 scale. 
The urban market variable shows that 36.3% of MFIs concentrate efforts solely in urban 
markets. This is a surprisingly low percentage, considering the difficulties in reaching rural 
areas (Helms, 2006). 22.5% of MFIs serve only rural markets, and 41.2% serve both. We also 
see that the typical MFI is young, although one institution can trace its microfinance activity to 
1923, when it began to give loans to small farmers. However, MFIs have generally had little 
time to build up a relationship with their customers. 
The Human Development Index (HDI) minimum and maximum values show that firms come 
from a wide variety of country backgrounds. The inclusion of the HDI may capture some of 
their institutional differences. 
Table 4 presents correlations between explanatory variables. 
Table 4 
Many correlations are significant. The question is whether multi-collinearity is strong enough to 
invalidate the simultaneous inclusion of these variables in regressions. Kennedy (2008) states 
that multi-collinearity is a problem when the correlation coefficient is above 0.70, which is not 
the case here. In addition, since panel data estimation gives more data points, the multi-
collinearity problem here is reduced even further (Hsiao, 2003). 
5. Econometric evidence 
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We report results from random effects panel data estimations of the relationships between 
financial performance and outreach, as well as the variables in the three dimensions of 
governance from Table 3.  
5.1. Financial performance 
Table 5 shows results from regressions with ROA, OSS, portfolio yield, and operational costs 
as dependent variables. 
Table 5 
The models encompass explanatory variables from Table 3. The overall Wald statistic shows 
rejection of the hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero in all specifications. We 
comment on all regressions together. Although the signs of the coefficients are mostly as 
expected, it is striking that so few results are significant. However, interesting results appear in 
both significant and non-significant findings.  
In the owner-board relationship, CEO/chairman duality is significant only in the portfolio 
regressions. Thus, we cannot say whether the MFI is better governed when the CEO is not also 
the chairman, confirming the Brickley et al. (1997) result. Contrary to Oxelheim and Randøy 
(2003), we find that international directors reduce the MFI’s performance by reducing OSS and 
inflating costs. The Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) result may be because international directors 
bring a superior business orientation to Scandinavian firms. However, in MFIs, they may bring 
a culture of higher costs. The board is presumably better informed with an internal board 
auditor, and this should improve financial performance. This is confirmed for OSS. We cannot 
confirm Hartarska (2005) and the general literature that performance improves with a smaller 
board. Thus, the MFI board improves performance when it is local and better informed through 
the internal auditor. 
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Furthermore, it turns out that being an SHF does not improve MFI performance. The SHF 
variable is not significant in any regressions. This is not necessarily surprising. Crespi et al. 
(2004) find similar results when they compare savings banks and commercial banks in Spain. 
Furthermore, Mersland and Strøm (2008) find no differences in profitability between 
microfinance SHFs and NPOs. 
In the MFI-customer dimension, the female CEO variable is significant and positive in ROA 
and OSS regressions. The results confirm findings in Welbourne (1999) and Smith et al. (2006) 
that women in management have a positive impact on firm performance. Because 
approximately 73% of the customers in our sample are women, the result may indicate that a 
female CEO reduces information asymmetry vis-à-vis customers more than a male CEO does. 
It may be that a female CEO knows better what products women want and sets terms that 
appeal to women. In this way, our results underline the importance of the MFI-customer 
relationship. It is also possible to infer from Table 4 that women self-select ownership types 
with superior performance. However, further analysis shows this to be unlikely: while female 
CEOs in our dataset are over-represented in NPOs, the average real ROA shows a negligible 
difference between this and other ownership types, specifically SHFs. 
Individual loan is never a significant variable in our regressions. Non-significance in the ROA 
and OSS regressions indicates that sustainable financial performance can be achieved with both 
individual and group lending. The proposed comparative efficiency in group lending is not 
confirmed.  
External governance mechanisms show a positive, significant result for competition in a 
portfolio yield regression. Thus, it appears that MFI performance can increase with more 
competition, an outcome mentioned by Nickell (1996), and may be due to first entrants 
becoming more efficient when new MFIs enter their market.  However, the portfolio yield 
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result is counter-intuitive and should be analysed further. We find no significant results 
concerning the impact of regulation, which is in line with Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007).  
We carry out additional regressions using various alternative specifications, and we find that 
they yield similar results to those reported in Tables 5 (unpublished data). New explanatory 
variables (female directors, stakeholders, the number of board meetings), alternative definitions 
(only rural instead of only urban in the market definition, MFIs per population as competition),
8
 
filtering cooperatives, state banks, and “other” ownership type definitions all yield results that 
are consistent with those in Table 5. We conclude that our reported results are robust to several 
specifications.  
The overall conclusion is that few traditional internal and external corporate governance 
mechanisms influence the financial performance of MFIs, with the exception of internal 
auditors and local directors. The positive effect of having a female CEO indicates the 
importance of supplementing board monitoring with attention to the MFI-customer relationship. 
These results are internally consistent. For instance, the positive impact of a female CEO is 
reflected in the negative impact of international directors, which is probably due to differences 
in client knowledge. We also find internal consistency in the SHF result. From Table 4, it 
appears that the SHF has a presumably better board structure than other ownership types; it has 
an internal auditor, a smaller board, and it is regulated. However, the SHF has more 
international directors and fewer female CEOs. The SHF, therefore, may be less able to tap into 
local information networks, and the overall result is that its performance is not better than other 
MFIs. Both theoretical and empirical studies show that a board should not be wholly 
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 Data from the Mixmarket (www.mixmarket.org) are used; approximately 1,200 MFIs report to 
this service. 
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independent of the CEO, but should also include internal directors who can increase the board’s 
access to local information. The female CEO may exert a similar effect in the MFIs. 
An interpretation of the few significant results is that Allen and Gale (2000) are correct in 
maintaining that governance is of little importance for financial performance. Although the 
results confirm their emphasis on the CEO, their negative argument concerns the board, where 
we also find significance in international directors and the internal board auditor. Thus, despite 
the small number of significant results, we conclude that governance matters for the financial 
performance of microfinance institutions. 
5.2. Outreach 
Table 6 shows regressions of the effects of our variables on two measures of outreach – the 
average loan and the number of credit clients.  
Table 6 
Governance mechanisms generally have little impact on outreach. In fact, only CEO/chairman 
duality and individual loan are significant. Thus, the CEO/chairman can increase the number of 
customers. This is mainly a firm size effect. An interaction variable of the duality dummy with 
firm size is positive and significant. By instituting duality, the MFI presumably pursues a 
managerial goal of firm size maximisation (Berle and Means, 1932). 
A puzzling question is why the female CEO is not significant in outreach while she is important 
for financial performance. We argue that the female CEO is better informed, which should 
result in greater outreach. However, better information is presumably independent of average 
loan size and the number of borrowers, thus giving only insignificant coefficients. 
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Individual loans tend to be associated with higher average loan sizes and fewer credit clients. 
Group lenders have better outreach compared to individual lenders, confirming the results in 
Cull et al. (2007).  
6. Conclusions 
This paper responds to the need for more knowledge on corporate governance in MFIs (CSFI, 
2008). Using a comparatively large and unique self-constructed dataset based on rating reports, 
the effects of owner-board relationships, firm-customer relationships, and external corporate 
governance on four measures of financial performance and two measures of outreach are 
studied in MFIs.  
Panel data estimations show that financial performance improves when the board has local 
rather than international directors and when it employs an internal board auditor. Ownership 
type, however, does not affect financial performance. In the MFI-customer dimension, we find 
that the MFI is better served with a female CEO. The external mechanisms of competition and 
bank regulation have little impact on MFI performance. In outreach performance regressions, 
even fewer governance variables are significant. We find that outreach increases with 
CEO/chairman duality (the number of credit clients), but decreases with individual loans for 
both average loan size and the number of credit clients. The significance of results may improve 
with better data. 
Several of this study’s findings and non-findings are puzzling, which motivates future research 
and the reconsideration of governance policy guidelines in the industry. We suggest the 
following five points.  
First, a wholesale importation of best practices in governance mechanisms from mature markets 
is probably counter-productive at this stage of the industry’s development. Traditional board 
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oversight and public regulation do not seem to be solutions to MFI governance, and the call for 
transforming NPOs into shareholder-owned firms lacks foundation. Instead, there is a need to 
better understand how the MFI can tap into local information networks, and how different 
incorporations operating in the same market influence MFI performance and overall customer 
satisfaction and outreach. 
Second, the surprising effect of competition--that it may not bring customer benefits--highlights 
not only a need for new research, but also the need to search for governance mechanisms that 
do bring benefits to both the MFI and its customers. Perhaps studies of past pro-poor banking 
systems such as savings banks and cooperatives, which once operated in uncompetitive and 
unregulated markets similar to MFIs (Caprio and Vitas, 1997), can yield new governance 
knowledge for today. 
Third, it is important to ask why individual lending reduces outreach, noting that MFIs tend to 
shift from group loans to individual loans (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). The 
results in Table 5 indicate that individual lending is not related to improved financial results, so 
why are MFIs shifting in their methodology when it lowers outreach? New dedicated studies 
are necessary to better understand the trade-offs in lending methodology. 
Fourth, the negative effect of international directors on MFI financial performance warrant 
further research into the effect of international influence on MFI performance. Numerous 
international actors such as lenders, consultants, investors, networks, donors, and service 
providers are active in the microfinance industry. What is their impact? Does their presence 
hinder the MFI in its efforts to build relationships with local stakeholders? 
Finally, the low stakeholder representation found in MFI boards deserves further study. Who is 
actually governing MFIs, and how do they govern? Are most MFIs fundamentally dominated 
by managers, and if so, does it matter? 
 21 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for dependent variables used in the analysis 
Variable Mean Std Min Max N Definition 
ROA 0.015 0.126 -0.898 0.790 891 (Net operating income)/(Average annual assets) 
 - inflation Net operating income)/( 
OSS 1.119 0.384 0.076 2.949 614 (Revenue from operations)/(Financial expense 
      + loan loss expense + operating expense) 
Portfolio yield 0.391 0.202 0.033 1.825 895 (Interest revenue)/(Average loan portfolio) 
Operational costs 0.314 0.263 0.028 3.507 867 (Operating expenses)/(Average loan portfolio) 
Average loan 788 1377 2 24589 895 (Loan portfolio)/(Credit clients) 
Credit clients 12805 26861 74 394374 905 Number of credit clients 
  
Table 2: Definitions of independent variables and their hypothesised sign with respect to financial performance (FinP) 
and outreach firm performance 
  Hypothesis 
Variable Explanation  FinP  Outreach    
CEO/chairman duality CEO and chairman are the same person  +/- - 
International directors International directors divided by board size  + - 
Internal board auditor A dummy with the value 1 if the MFI has an internal auditor reporting 
to the board 
+ -/+ 
Board size The number of directors  - - 
SHF A dummy indicating a shareholder firm when 1  + - 
Female CEO A dummy indicating a female when 1  + + 
Individual loan A dummy with the value 1 if loans are made mainly to individuals + - 
Competition A self-constructed measure of the local level of competition - + 
Bank regulated A dummy with the value 1 if the MFI is regulated by banking 
authorities 
-/+ + 
Urban market A dummy with the value 1 if the market served is urban only - - 
MFI age  Years of experience as an MFI     
Portfolio at risk The fraction of the portfolio with more than 30 days in arrears   
Firm size The natural logarithm of assets     
Human Development Index 
(HDI) 
A composite country index covering life expectancy, education, and 
income (GDP per capita) 
  
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of independent variables  
Variable Mean Std  Min Max N 
CEO/chairman duality 0.147 0.355 0.000 1.000 238 
International directors 0.576 1.216 0.000 6.000 210 
Internal board auditor 0.496 0.501 0.000 1.000 226 
Female CEO 0.235 0.425 0.000 1.000 234 
Board size 7.391 3.765 2.000 33.000 248 
SHF 0.285 0.452 0.000 1.000 277 
Bank regulation 0.317 0.466 0.000 1.000 278 
Competition 4.414 1,626 1.000 7.000 256 
Individual loan 0.536 0.500 0.000 1.000 261 
Urban market 0.363 0.482 0.000 1.000 267 
MFI age 9.201 7.327 0.000 79.000 964 
Portfolio at risk (30) 0.071 0.105 0.000 0.980 839 
Firm size 14.887 1.367 9.856 19.337 930 
Human Dev. Index 0.684 0.120 0.338 0.863 274 
 
  
 29 
Table 4: Pearson correlations between explanatory variables 
 Int. Intern Board  Femal
ee 
Indiv. Bank  Urban MFI    
 dir. audit size SHF CEO loan Regul. Compe
t. 
Market age PaR30 Assets HDI 
CEO/chair. -0.128 0.054 -0.026 0.020 0.029 -0.089 -0.037 0.045 -0.030 -0.027 -0.016 0.091 -0.068 
Internat. Dir.  0.174 -0.149 0.219 -0.010 -0.034 0.120 -0.062 -0.113 -0.225 -0.193 -0.053 -0.089 
Internal auditor   -0.137 0.184 -0.002 0.096 0.168 0.199 -0.192 0.100 -0.054 0.212 0.114 
Board size    -0.206 0.169 -0.185 -0.008 -0.221 0.034 0.009 -0.004 0.057 -0.084 
SHF 
 
    -0.170 0.144 0.503 0.020 0.114 -0.061 -0.081 0.198 -0.133 
Female CEO      -0.095 -0.059 -0.086 -0.123 -0.069 -0.062 -0.096 0.161 
Individual loan       0.172 0.077 0.049 0.015 0.120 0.162 0.272 
Bank regul.        0.014 0.191 0.066 -0.045 0.195 -0.174 
Competition         -0.120 0.089 0.053 0.125 -0.053 
Urban market          -0.065 -0.243 -0.007 0.003 
MFI age           0.180 0.424 -0.003 
PaR30            0.106 -0.005 
Assets             -0.085 
Bold: Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Bold and italics: Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 5: Return on assets (ROA), operational self-sufficiency (OSS), portfolio yield (PY), and operational costs (OC) 
explained by board characteristics, internal and external governance mechanisms, and firm and economy characteristics. 
3SLS random effects estimation of panel data spanning 1998 to 2007.  
 ROA OSS PY OC 
Constant -0.418** -0.411 -0.104** 1.140** 
CEO/chairman duality -0.032 -0.154 0.118** 0.074 
International directors -0.010 -0.095** 0.010 0.037** 
Internal board auditor 0.022 0.133* -0.034 -0.018 
Board size -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 0.001 
SHF -0.012 -0.129 -0.011 0.027 
Female CEO 0.053** 0.215** 0.059 -0.036 
Individual loan 0.034 0.014 -0.026 -0.039 
Competition 0.011 -0.011 0.022* 0.004 
Bank regulation 0.005 0.056 0.019 0.015 
Urban market 0.001 0.090 0.066* 0.044 
MFI experience 0.000 -0.010** -0.002 -0.003 
Portfolio at risk (30) -0.085 0.436** -0.132* -0.131** 
Firm size 0.026** 0.119** 0.006 -0.078** 
Human dev. Index -0.100 -0.194 0.279 0.413** 
Wald F (sign.) 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firm years 342 303 343 352 
The Wald test (Greene, 2003 p. 107) is here a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients in the given equation are all zero. A low value 
indicates null hypothesis rejection. If R  is the Kq  matrix of q  restrictions and K  coefficients, ˆ  the K  vector of coefficients, and 
r  the vector of the q  restrictions, the Wald 2  statistic is        ˆRrRRˆRr)q(
1
X
2
, where X is the 
estimated covariance matrix of coefficients. 
 
Significant results at the 5% (10%) level are marked with ** (*). 
 
Variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
ROA is inflation-adjusted. ROA0 is for the most recent rating year, ROA1 for the second most recent year. The same applies to OSS0, OSS1. 
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Table 6: Outreach performance, specified as average loan size and the number of credit clients, regressed on board 
characteristics, MFI innovations, and external variables. Random effects panel data 3SLS estimation for four years of 
observations. 
 Average Credit 
 Loan Client 
Constant -2.825** -58.962** 
CEO/chairman duality -0.120 14.004** 
International directors -0.068 -0.201 
Internal board auditor -0.067 1.110 
Board size -0.028 0.801 
SHF -0.241 0.059 
Female CEO 0.180 4.964 
Individual loan 0.548** -6.641* 
Competition -0.020 1.410 
Bank regulation 0.234 -0.673 
Urban market -0.170 1.442 
MFI experience -0.020* 0.221 
Portfolio at risk (30) 0.331 1.784 
Firm size 0.209** 5.228** 
Human dev. Index 0.999 -33.809** 
Wald F (sign.) 0.000 0.000 
Firm years 351 355 
Average loan size is defined to be between US $0 to $10,000, and weighted using purchasing power parity GDP 
adjustments (IMF: World Economic Outlook). 
The number of credit clients is scaled by 1,000. 
